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Abstract 
 
This paper examines whether noncognitive skills — measures both by personality traits and 
economic preference parameters — influence cognitive tests performance. The basic idea is 
that noncognitive skills might affect the effort people put into a test to obtain good results. We 
experimentally varied the rewards for questions in a cognitive test to measure to what extent 
people are sensitive to financial incentives. To distinguish increased mental effort from extra 
time investments we also varied the question’ time constraints. Subjects with favorable 
personality traits such as high performance-motivation and an internal locus of control 
perform relatively well in the absence of rewards; consistent with a model in which trying as 
hard as you can is the best strategy. In contrast, favorable economic preference parameters 
(low discount rate, low risk aversion) are associated with increases in time investments when 
incentives are introduced, consistent with a rational economic model in which people only 
invest when there are monetary returns. The main conclusion is that individual behavior at 
cognitive tests depends on noncognitive skills. 
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1I. Introduction
This paper reports findings of an experiment to examine whether measured cognitive
test scores are influenced by noncognitive skills. The basic idea of our analysis is that the
performance on a cognitive test not only depends on the actual cognitive abilities a person
possesses, but also depends on the willingness to put mental effort in answering difficult
questions in the absence of extrinsic rewards. A relationship between noncognitive skills and
cognitive test scores can exist for two reasons. First, people who are motivated to perform
well, and who have a positive attitude towards work, might be more inclined to do their best
at tests, irrespective of the rewards offered. If so, high IQ-scores might partly reflect
favorable noncognitive skills and correlations between cognitive skills and outcomes are
upward biased. Second, people with favorable behavioral or labor-market outcomes might
have  an  attitude  to  put  effort  in  a  task  only  when  there  are  sufficient  rewards.  This  could
serve as an explanation for a successful career despite lower cognitive test scores at school.
To investigate the relationship between noncognitive skills and cognitive test scores,
we performed an experiment in which we first measured psychological traits and economic
preference parameters of 128 students. Next, these students carried out a cognitive test.
Initially there were no rewards for right answers, but later on we introduced payments for
right answers. To disentangle the effect of increased mental effort from increased time
investments we also varied the time available for each question. To investigate whether our
results are affected by heterogeneity in the marginal value of time we ended the experiment
by measuring the marginal price for the willingness to spend time doing nothing.
We find that students put substantially more time in answering IQ questions when
rewards are higher. The effect of extra time investments on test scores is less obvious, and
depends on the type and difficulty of the IQ question. When time constraints are very
binding the effects disappear, suggesting that people cannot increase mental effort as a
substitute for investing more time. We find several personality traits for which the effect of
rewards  on  the  time  spent  to  answer  a  question  is  significantly  smaller  than  average:
performance-motivation, internal locus of control and curiosity. Also components from the
five-factor model of personality structure, such as emotional stability and conscientiousness
are associated with a low effect of rewards on extra time investments. Students with a high
preference for leisure (measured by psychological tests) and a negative fear of failure
increase their efforts to answer questions more than average when rewards go up. This also
holds for the component measuring openness to new experiences from the five-factor model
2of personality structure.
For the economic preference parameters we find the opposite result. Students with
high discount rates, high risk aversion and a high preference for leisure (measured by
questions in which the respondent has to tradeoff time and money) tend to decrease time
spent on an IQ question more than others, when rewards are increased. Again, the incentives
do not always increase performance. Since in general low discount rates and low levels of
risk aversion are also associated with favorable behavioral or labor-market outcomes this is
surprising. A potential explanation is that economic preference parameters are measured by
questions about economic trade-offs. Possibly, people differ in their ability to deal with such
trade-offs, explaining why the psychological measures might pick up other aspects of
noncognitive skills than the economics preference parameters.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the set up of the experiment and
presents basic information about the several tests included. Section III discusses the
measures of noncognitive skills. Section IV presents the results and Section V concludes.
II. Experiment
Design
We conducted an experiment with different time constraints and financial incentives
on IQ questions to examine the influence of different preferences and types on the
performance in this cognitive test. 128 subjects participated in the experiment. They are all
Dutch students from Maastricht University and the experiment was conducted in Dutch. The
Appendix at the end of the paper provides more background information. The experiment
was conducted in four stages.
Personality
In the first stage of the experiment, subjects were giving answers to statements to
determine psychological traits and were asked to make trade-offs to determine relevant
economic preference parameters. We selected ten psychological traits that appear to be
potentially relevant for the decision to put effort in a test regardless of the reward. In
psychology there is a long tradition to search for traits explaining differences in the tendency
to perform well. Following the work of Atkinson and Reitman (1958) and Edwards (1959),
Hermans (1975) developed Dutch tests for this purpose that are still considered as the norm
in the field. We applied shortened versions of Hermans’ test of performance-motivation,
3preference for leisure, positive fear of failure and negative fear of failure. We added tests for
internal locus of control and social desirability (Rotter scale), enjoyment of success (Steers
and Black, 1994), and resilience (Siebert, 1993) because the attitude to relate success and
failure to one’s own performance and to stay motivated after failure are generally regarded
as important elements for success. We also added a test for curiosity (Steers and Black,
1994), because curious people might have more fun solving questions in cognitive tests. The
attitude  towards  work  from  the  World  Value  Study  has  been  added,  since  this  test  is
available  for  a  wide  variety  of  countries.  In  all  tests  respondents  had  to  answer  on  a  five-
point scale to what extent statements hold for them. We checked for the reliability of the
statements included using Cronbach’s alpha. Average normalized scores (reversing scores on
negative statements) are used as measures in our analyses.1
We also included items from the five-factor model of personality structure (“big
five”) measuring emotional stability, introversion, openness, agreeableness and
conscientiousness. Here respondents have to characterize themselves on a five-point scale
between two extreme characterizations. The five-factor model of personality structure
described by Goldberg (1990) is introduced as an attempt to summarize the wide spectrum of
psychological traits that matter for behavior. This model was developed as a broad model
defining five independent categories underlying a number of related personality facets of
more specific attributes. It originated already in the 1930s when people tried to organize
traits commonly used to develop a taxonomy of measurable characteristics (e.g., Allport and
Odbert, 1936).
Preference parameters
Additionally we included questions to measure economic preference parameters. By
posing questions in which respondents are asked to make a trade-off between current and
future rewards, certain and risky rewards, and money and leisure, we measured time
preference, risk aversion and preference for leisure. In the analyses we apply average scores
for each parameter.  Risk preference is measured by two series of questions.  There are two
questions describing a situation in which risk taking behavior is assessed and two sets of
questions on deals people can strike with probabilities of getting nothing. By increasing the
amount of money at stake we can determine how risk averse subjects are. Figure Ia plots risk
preference. The horizontal axis is increasing in risk taking. The average risk preference
1 Scores based on weights obtained from factor analyses provide similar results.
4parameter equals 1.239 and the standard deviation is 0.526.
The discount rate is measured in a similar way but now with questions referring to
possible future benefits or future money that can be consumed at some cost in the present.
By assessing the willingness of subjects to postpone present consumption for future
consumption, we determine the discount rate. Figure Ib plots the discount rate. The
horizontal axis is increasing in the discount rate, which should be interpreted as an
increasing tendency to value the present more than the future. The average discount rate is
0.247 with a standard deviation of 0.120.2
Preference for leisure can be measured both by statements as in the psychological
tradition and by imposing explicit trade-offs. We measured the preference for leisure in this
economic fashion by two questions giving subjects the opportunity to either trade leisure for
money or exchange money for leisure time. Figure Ic plots the preference for leisure, with
the horizontal axis increasing in preference for leisure. The average preference for leisure is
0.912, with a standard deviation of 0.215.
Cognitive tests
The second stage of the experiment was a cognitive test consisting of ten IQ
questions selected randomly from a set of 80 possible questions. The ten IQ questions are of
the following types. Two Raven matrices, two sequences or matrices of numbers, two filling
in linking words, one anagram, one sequence or matrix of characters, one “stranger in our
midst”, and one question from the Cognitive Reflection Test by Frederick (see Frederick,
2005). The first row in Table I reports the mean levels and standards errors of the total score
(Panel A) and duration (Panel B) in the second stage, and the same numbers disaggregated
by type of IQ question. The score is measured as the fraction of correct answers and duration
is measured in seconds used to answer a question.
The third stage was a cognitive test consisting of seven sets of ten questions in which
in each set there was a possible time constraint (no time constraint, 60 seconds or 30
seconds) and incentive pay (no pay, €0.10, €0.40 or €1.00 for each correct answer). Subjects
always had to complete one set of questions without incentive pay and two sets of questions
under each incentive pay regime. So, the maximum earnings in the third stage are €30.00.
The average earnings were €16.53 (with a standard deviation of €3.44). All respondents had
2 The discount rates reported in the literature vary substantially, which seems to be due to the wording of the
questions. Evidence shows that the relative position of individuals on the scale is rather stable across questions
(e.g., Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2002). The discount rate reported here is relatively low.
5to answer the full set of 80 IQ questions, but we randomized the order to separate the effect
of tiredness and experience with the questions from the difficulty of the question. The
composition  of  each  set  of  ten  questions  was  always  the  same as  in  the  first  set  described
above. After each block of ten questions, there was a one minute break during which
subjects could recover but were not allowed to do anything else then sit still. We report in
Table I, from row (2) onwards, the scores (Panel A) and duration (Panel B) under different
time constraints and incentive pay combinations. The overall picture shows that – in
comparison with later questions without time constraints – subjects thought longest when
they were first confronted with the IQ questions (81.601 seconds) and scored relatively well
(0.622) during the second stage of the experiment. The first column of Table I shows that in
general higher incentive pay increases time investments in answering the questions. The
scores are higher for any incentive pay although not for the questions with a time constraint
of 30 seconds. In this latter case the time constraint seems to be binding because 24.8 percent
of the questions are not answered within the 30-second time frame. For the 60-second time
limit this is true for only 10.4 percent.
The remaining columns show the mean score and duration by type of IQ question.
The scores in Panel A reveal that the Raven matrices, the sequences or matrices of numbers
and the Frederick questions have been answered relatively well and that filling in missing
words has been most difficult. Furthermore, time limits reduce scores on almost all
questions. The most striking effects of time constraints are found for fillings in missing
words, the sequence or matrix of characters, and the Frederick questions. Compared to the
no limit case, scores are reduced by some 50 percent with a 30-second time limit. In general,
scores weakly rise with incentive pay, but not in case of the 30-second time limit. The most
prominent increases are found for the Raven matrices, the sequences or matrices of numbers
and the Frederick questions (except for the 30-second time limit).
Panel B shows that subjects spend more time on difficult questions because we
observe a negative relationship between duration and scores; with the exception of the
“stranger in our midst” questions. Time spent on answering questions increases with
incentive pay, except for questions with a 30-second time limit. The time spent on answering
a question reduces dramatically when comparing the no limit to the 60-second limit
questions. Comparison of the distributions reveals that most questions that would have taken
more time than the limit allows for are answered in the last ten seconds before the time limit
(or too late).
6Overall,  Table  I  shows  that  time  constraints  exert  more  impact  on  test  scores  than
incentive pay does. Putting in time constraints reduces scores, whereas incentive pay
increases scores in the no limit case only. Moreover, subjects significantly increase time
investments in the case of incentive pay. A further analysis shows that thinking longer
affects scores of relatively easy questions (on which people do well), and also the scores of
some of the Frederick questions, the sequence or matrix of numbers, the Raven matrices and
the “stranger in our midst” questions (see Borghans, Meijers and ter Weel, 2006 for more
elaborate results).
Value of Time
To ensure that students traded-off the benefits of giving a right answer with the costs
of investing more time, they were instructed at the beginning of the experiment that every
student could leave the experiment room and get paid when ready. However, we also told
them that there was the opportunity to stay and take part in the fourth stage. On beforehand
this was told to subjects, without them knowing what this stage would be other than that they
could earn some additional money. At the beginning of the fourth stage subjects were shown
Figure IIa. The horizontal axis measures time in minutes and the vertical axis cumulative
earnings. Subjects could participate by sitting still and doing nothing else than watching for a
minute to go by. After the first minute they earned €0.75. After each minute they could
choose to either stay or leave. The program reported after each minute of waiting time, and
before the decision to stay for another minute, the total amount of money earned so far (this
includes the earnings from the previous stage). The maximum number of minutes subjects
could wait was 30, with the thirtieth minute paying €0.01. The total amount of money at
stake during this half hour was €7.10.
Figure IIb shows the distribution of subjects by the minute after which they
completed the experiment. Figure IIb shows that a considerable fraction of subjects (5.5
percent) left the experiment immediately. At the other extreme 13.2 percent of the
population waited until the 29th minute or stayed until the end. The average waiting time
equals 15.92 minutes, with a standard deviation of 8.18 minutes. This equals average
earnings of €5.47 (standard deviation is €1.77). Figure IIc plots the marginal earnings for the
last minute a subject stayed. The average marginal earnings equal €0.20 per minute, with a
standard deviation of €0.18, which equals an hourly rate of €12.00, which is well above the
legal minimum hourly wage. The legal gross minimum hourly wage is set at €6.24 for a 22-
7year old person in the Netherlands in 2006. Surveys among students in the Netherlands
reveal that students earn about €8-€10 per hour when working next to their studies.
The purpose of this exercise is to measure the value of time and the value of money
of each subject. We use this information to deal with differences between subjects regarding
how much they care about money. In addition, if some subjects would be in a hurry and only
interested in completing the experiment as soon as possible, the average duration of
completing a question could be affected.3
III. Noncognitive skills
Personality
Table II presents unconditional correlations between the ten personality traits and the
five-factor model of personality structure.4 In general the correlation coefficients are low,
which confirms the measurement of distinct traits. There are some stronger correlations
between  the  ten  traits  and  the  big-five  items  reflecting  the  clusters  to  which  these  traits
apparently belong. Interesting correlations are obtained between performance-motivation
and the preference for leisure. The strong negative and significant coefficient is consistent
with motivated subjects being less eager to enjoy leisure time. The negative correlation
between negative fear of failure and emotional stability is consistent with emotionally stable
persons being less vulnerable to fears, which is also reflected by the positive correlation
between emotional stability and resilience. Introvert subjects do not enjoy success as much
as extravert subjects and conscientious subjects have an internal locus of control and score
higher on performance-motivation.
Preference Parameters
Table III presents the correlations between personality traits and the economic
preference parameters. In general the correlation coefficients are significant but low. Most
correlations are not surprising, such as the negative correlation between internal locus of
control and the discount rate, the positive correlation between risk preference and resilience,
and the negative correlation between the preference for leisure and negative fear of failure.
3 The experiments were run at different periods during the day. There are no significant differences in the
behavior of subjects across different sessions.
4 Residual correlations with controls for age, family background, gender and region of birth show similar
results.
8IV. Results
Which types perform better?
The first question when analyzing the link between noncognitive and cognitive skills
is whether personality types are correlated with cognitive skills.5 Panel A of Table IV first
shows the estimates of a probit model in which we one by one regress personality types on
the probability of giving the correct answer. Three different models have been estimated:
One without any additional controls, one with controls for the type of cognitive test question
and one with controls for the type of cognitive question, the amount of incentive pay and the
time constraint. Comparison of the three columns shows that there are no large differences
between the three different equations. Subjects who report to have higher levels of
performance-motivation, which have a higher positive fear of failure and an internal locus of
control, and subjects who are more curious have a higher probability of giving a correct
answer. In addition, subjects suffering from negative fear of failure have a lower probability
to  give  the  correct  answer.  Positive  fear  of  failure  is  associated  with  tense  feelings  that
improve  performance,  whereas  negative  fear  of  failure  is  associated  with  feelings  that  are
harmful for performance.
The measures from the five-factor model of personality structure show that
introversion as opposed to extraversion is related to the probability of giving the correct
answer. Openness and agreeableness reduce this probability. Generally, the coefficients of
the personality test and the five-factor model of personality structure are consistent with self-
disciplined and motivated subjects achieving higher probabilities of giving the correct
answer.
The estimates for the economic preference parameters show that subjects with lower
discount rates have a higher probability of giving the correct answer, as well as subjects who
are more risk averse. The first estimate is consistent with the economic literature suggesting
that more intelligent people have lower discount rates. The coefficient for risk preference is
surprising since the economic literature suggests that more intelligent people are more able
to foresee future events and as a result less risk averse.
Panel B presents estimates for the same models with duration as the dependent
variable. Duration is measured as the log of the number of seconds a subject spends on
answering a question. The estimates show that subjects with higher levels of motivation and
those who are more eager to do well on the test invest more time in answering a question.
5 This analysis includes the answers to questions in the third stage only.
9This can be seen from the positive coefficients on performance-motivation, positive fear of
failure, resilience and enjoyment of success; and the negative coefficient for the preference
for leisure under personality. Another interesting observation is that the other coefficients are
associated with fear of failure implying that people who are afraid to give the wrong answer
spend more time answering the question (e.g., negative fear of failure, enjoyment of success,
and agreeableness).
The results from the economic preference parameters show that less risk-averse
subjects and subjects with higher discount rates spend more time answering the questions,
which could be explained as these persons having lower levels of self-confidence.
Who is sensitive to incentives?
The mere correlation between personality traits, preference parameters and cognitive
test scores can be the result of causal mechanisms that go in opposite directions. People who
are more motivated or more willing to invest might put more effort in their learning and
consequently do better on an IQ test, or people with higher cognitive abilities might better
understand the importance of certain noncognitive traits and therefore invest more in the
development of these traits. A full understanding of these correlations also requires taking
parents and teachers into account. In this paper we focus on the question whether
noncognitive skills influence the way students perform on a cognitive test, conditional on
their true cognitive abilities at the time of the test.
Panel A of Table V reports the estimates of the following model
qqqqq IPIPAC ebbb ++++= )*()Pr( 321
where )Pr( qC represents the probability of a correct answer to question q, qP is a personality
trait or preference parameter, qI is the amount of incentive pay (€0, €0.10, €0.40 or €1.00),
qIP )*( is an interaction between incentive pay and a personality trait or preference
parameter, and qe is an error term with the usual assumptions. The coefficient for the
qIP )*(  term  is  of  interest  because  it  reveals  the  responsiveness  of  different  types  to
incentive pay. There are two potential ways in which a student can adjust his efforts when
answering questions in an IQ test. First, subjects might think harder about a question and as
a result obtain a higher probability of giving the correct answer. Second, subjects might
invest more time on each question. To disentangle these effects we varied the time
restrictions for the questions in the test. We estimate two version of this model. First, we
10
estimate the model in which we only consider the case in which there is no time constraint
for answering a question. Second, we estimate the model with dummies for the different time
constraints (no constraints, 60 seconds or 30 seconds). Both models include fixed effects for
the type of cognitive test question.
We only report the coefficients on qP  and qIP )*( . The coefficients for qP are
generally similar to the ones presented in Table IV above. The coefficients for qIP )*( are
the most interesting. A positive (negative) coefficient implies that subjects obtain higher
(lower) scores when they receive incentive pay. Almost all coefficients are insignificant,
revealing no substantial differences between personalities in improving scores when
incentives are introduced. This can be the result of either a low preference for money or the
inability to respond to incentives by improving scores. Including our measure for the
preference for money or the value of time shown and discussed in Figure II does not change
the results suggesting that the results are not shaped by differences in the preference for
money.  The  estimates  are  also  consistent  with  the  figures  presented  in  Table  I  where  we
showed that subjects do not seem to be able to improve scores when we introduce incentive
pay.
Panel B of Table V reports the estimates of the same models for duration:
qqqqq IPIPAD ebbb ++++= )*(321
where qD is the log of the time taken to answer each question. From this analysis it becomes
clear that subjects do respond to incentives in the sense that they invest more time in
answering the questions. This is consistent with the numbers in Table I. The qIP )*(
coefficients for successful traits are negative, which implies that subjects with higher scores
for these traits invest less time in answering a question when there is incentive pay compared
to  subjects  who  score  lower  on  this  trait.  The  coefficients  for  performance-motivation
suggest that subjects who are intrinsically motivated tend to think longer when answering a
question, but less so if they are paid relative to subjects who are less motivated. The same
goes for curious persons and those who have a relative internal locus of control. When
looking at the coefficients for the five-factor model of personality structure, the same result
is obtained for relatively emotionally stable and conscientious persons. Finally, the economic
preference parameters point into the opposite direction. In particular subjects with lower
discount  rates  are  more  sensitive  to  incentive  pay  and  invest  less  in  general.  On  the  other
hand, risk-averse persons spend less time when there is no incentive pay and respond
11
stronger to incentive pay.
The general message from these estimates is that particular types of persons seem to
be more or less sensitive to incentive pay, although the effects on scores are limited.
Implications for economic theory
The overall picture emerging from the estimates presented in this paper is that our
estimates are consistent with different explanations. Motivation and self-discipline seem to
be important traits to be successful in real life (e.g. Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001 and
Duckworth and Seligman, 2005) and people with these traits generally perform better on the
cognitive test (Table IV). However, the response to incentives is twofold.
First, it might be the case that people with successful characteristics respond stronger
to incentives because they are economically rational and are only interested in optimizing
income. This implies that people with successful traits under-perform on cognitive tests if
there  is  not  much  at  stake.  Such  a  theory  is  consistent  with  the  findings  of  Heckman  and
Rubinstein (2001) who report that high school dropouts obtaining a GED do equally well on
cognitive test scores but lack motivation and self-discipline to succeed in most jobs.
Second, it might be the case that people with successful characteristics are always
motivated to do their best and do not calculate the net benefits of every action. This shows
that persons with favorable noncognitive skills over-perform on cognitive tests.
Our estimates of the responsiveness of economic preference parameters to financial
incentives point towards the rational economic model, while our estimates of the personality
traits and the five-factor model of personality structure point towards the second view in
which highly motivated people try as hard as they can. Perhaps persons with low discount
rates respond more to incentives because they are more intelligent and rational. Such an
interpretation would be consistent with the findings in Table I and those of Frederick (2005)
who shows that more intelligent people have lower discount rates. On the other hand,
estimates for the personality traits show that favorable traits such as performance-motivation,
internal locus of control, emotional stability and conscientious go along with lower
responses to financial incentives. Reviewing the correlations between the economic
parameters and the personality traits and the measures of the five-factor model of personality
structure reveals a relatively low correlation coefficient. Our reading of the evidence is that
apparently these measures are capturing different dimensions of traits and preferences. This
observation is strengthened by the at first sight inconsistent correlation between preference
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for leisure measured as personality trait and preference for leisure measured in the way
economists tend to think about preference for leisure (giving up money for leisure time).
V. Conclusion
This paper has presented the first direct estimates of the impact of noncognitive skills
on cognitive test scores. Our estimates show that subjects respond to financial incentives by
investing more time in answering a question. This investment is generally not increasing test
scores.  In  an  effort  to  determine  whether  different  types  of  persons  respond  differently  to
financial incentives we find that favorable economic preference parameters, such as low
discount rates and low risk aversion, are associated with strong responses to incentives. On
the other hand favorable psychological characteristics, such as performance-motivation and
internal locus of control, are associated with lower responses to financial incentives.
Research  in  this  area  is  relatively  new  and  much  can  be  learned  from  establishing
solid links between the psychological and economic literature. Psychologists have measured
behaviors and traits in many ways, whereas economists have focused on preference
parameters. Our estimates suggest that both are capturing different dimensions of
preferences and traits. Further research is needed to improve understanding concerning the
links between these fields to be really able to capture the effects of noncognitive skills and
behaviors on cognitive test scores and economic outcomes.
Appendix
This appendix provides details about the set up of the experiment. Instructions and
the program used to conduct the experiment are available upon request.
Participants
128 subjects participated in the experiment. They were all students from Maastricht
University recruited by email through the communication office of the university. The email
contained a hyperlink referring to a webpage through which people could register. Upon
registration we asked questions about gender, date and place of birth, highest level of
education of both parents, and college major.
Sessions and Rooms
The experiment was run in the week of 15-19 May 2006 in the experimental
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laboratory of the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration at Maastricht
University. There were thirteen sessions: Three on Monday, Wednesday, Thursday and
Friday and one on Tuesday morning. The sessions lasted for almost 2.5 hours. The morning
session started at 8.30 hrs, the early afternoon session at 12.00 hrs. and the late afternoon
session at 15.30 hrs.  During initial registration we randomly selected subjects into groups of
10-15 subjects and assigned them to sessions. All subjects received an invitation by email.
Upon arrival subjects had to wait in front of the laboratory until everybody arrived. There are
no differences between outcomes for different groups.
The laboratory consists of two rooms separated by a slide door. In both rooms there
are twelve computers available separated by screens, so people cannot see each other. Every
subject was assigned to a computer number and login name and password upon arrival. We
experimented with rooms consisting of females and males only and with rooms where males
sat next to females only and females next to males. There are no significant differences
between females sitting next to males and females sitting in a room with females only. The
same goes for males. One room was equipped with an air-conditioning system, but this too
does not show up in the results. There are also no significant differences between session at
different times of the day, supervisor etc.
The supervision during the experiment was always conducted by two persons: One
professional and one of the authors. The professional made sure people were not talking and
looking at other people’s answers (which made no sense because all questions were assigned
randomly, so nobody had the same question at the same time). He also guided people to the
exit when they completed the experiment. We controlled the progress of the experiment on a
master computer. On this computer the progress and cumulative earnings of every
participant were followed. After a subject completed the experiment, he had to leave the
room to receive his total earnings in cash in a separate room.
Instructions
Before the sessions started, one of the authors read the instructions to all participants.
These instructions are available upon request. Right before the first cognitive test started in
stage 2 (without incentives and time constraints), 50 percent of the subjects received a
message that it was important to try as hard as one can when completing the cognitive tests.
It turns out the instructions have a significant short-run effect but fade away soon (after two
sessions). This finding suggests that telling people to put in effort helps to obtain better
14
results, but it is only effective in the short term. A possible repetition of the instruction after
a couple of sessions might be effective, but we leave this for future research.
Earnings
All subjects were entitled to receiving a show up fee of €5.00, which was paid after
having finished the entire test. During the cognitive tests they could earn €30.00 when they
answered all questions correctly. In the fourth stage of the experiment €7.10 could be earned
when waiting for another half hour. So, the maximum amount of money that could be earned
was €42.10.
The average earnings during the cognitive test were €16.53. The average earning
during the fourth stage of waiting were €5.46, which is equal to an average waiting time of
15.92 minutes. The overall average earnings during the experiment were €26.99, which also
includes the show up fee.
Software and Data Collection
The experiment was programmed in PHP/MySQL and subjects completed the
experiment using the Microsoft Internet Explorer. All computers showed the login screen
upon arrival and when subjects logged on to the experiment they could start. It was not
possible to go back and forth in the program so once an answer had been given and the
subject had pressed “continue” or once time ran out during questions with a time constraint,
the next question appeared on the screen.
The data were collected on a server. The duration of the cognitive test questions is
measured in milliseconds. Because server time can be longer when the network is in heavy
use, we checked delays. The average delay is about 2 seconds, with no differences between
the different sessions.
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